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SIMPLIFIED CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS AND THE
SUPPLEMENTING AND AMENDING THEREOF
In a prior article,1 the writer reached the conclusion that the
formal charge should allege only so much matter as would ensure
a fair trial in the ordinary normal case. The reasoning was this:
The present system of criminal pleading is not flexible enough; it
should be made more flexible by giving the courts power to compel
the supplementing of the formal charge by bills of particulars, and
to compel the amending of the formal charge when it does not cor-
respond with the facts proved. Speed and celerity of punishment
are desirable. If the indictment is made too brief, the accused has
opportunity to secure postponements of the trial while he asks
for bills of particulars and pleads surprise when unexpected evi-
dence is presented by the prosecution. If the indictment is made
too long, the accused will similarly delay the trial while he picks
flaws and defects in the charge and pleads surprise when the alle-
gations of the indictment are different from the facts established.
Thus brevity and prolixity in the indictment may each give rise
to delay. The opportunities for delay do not vary directly as the
indictment is made more or less complex. They vary in geometric
ratio. Take any form of indictment as a standard. An indictment
twice as complex will give, not twice the opportunity to delay on
account of defects, but more than twice as many; and an indictment
containing but half the matter will give opportunity to more than
twice as many opportunities for delay by asking for futrher in-
formation. What is necessary for a fair trial in the normal or
average case should therefore be taken as the standard. If the
standard be made less than the normal the delays for further in-
formation will increase more in number than the delays for defects
will diminish. And if the standard be made more than the normal
the delays for defects will increase more in number than the delays
for further information will diminish. There is, however, one form
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of indictment for each separate offense which, when used, will re-
duce the combined causes of delay to a minimum.
This model indictment is to be part of a system of procedure
which has the following features: The first pleading on the part of
the state is the formal accusation, the contents of which we pro-
pose to discuss subsequently. This formal accusation may be
supplemented at the request of the accused when he shows that
information not found therein is desirable in order that he may have
a fair opportunity to present his defenses. Both the original and
the supplemental accusations imay be freely amended when it
appears that they do not state the transaction as it actually trans-
pired. The defendant has the right to secure postponement of
the trial when he shows that he is not prepared to meet the facts
as actually proved.
A study of the laws governing criminal )leading and the cases
interpreting such rules as found in the statute books and reports
of the various American jurisdictions does not assist the inquirer
to any great extent in the task of determining what averments
should be found in the model indictment under this system of pro-
cedure. The reason is this: Most of the states have found that
the common law forms were too cumbersome and that they con-
tained too much matter. They have, therefore, in varying degrees,
simplified the indictment. They have not, however, given the ac-
cused the right to compel the prosecution to give further informa-
tion when desirable. Since the accused does not have this right,
the formal accusation has not been simplified to an extent which
would be unfair to the accused in any considerable number of cases.
It is therefore impossible to determine from a study of these
statutes just what is the practical limit of brevity, or the extent
to which the indictment used in this model code should be simpli-
fied. To this extent only is an investigation of American statutes
valuable: it is certain that none jof the forms given mark the limit
of brevity. No serious objection on the grounds of injustice to
the accused has ever been raised to the forms in use, and it is self-
evident that, if such forms are sufficient to ensure a fair trial where
the accused has no right to supplemental information, they are
sufficient where he has such right. Certain states do permit the
use of bills of particulars, but it appears that the forms in such
states are no more brief than are the forms in the states which deny
that right.
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There are, however, certain codes of procedure in force at
present which embody these rights to freely supplement, and to
freely amend. The Massachusetts Codef is drawn on those lines.
The Code which is in force in Canada3 and New Zealand' is based
upon the same theories and the Code of Criminal Procedure in
force in India$ is a perfect embodiment of the theories. A study
of the forms prescribed by these codes ought to aid in the determi-
nation of what the formal accusation should contain, and from these
codes the following rules have been deduced.
The formal accusation or the charge, as it shall be termed
hereafter, should state the offense with which the accused is charged.
By this is meant that it should contain sufficient matter to identify
the offense charged as distinguished from the particular transac-
tion which constitutes the offense. Thus, the charge must show
whether the accused is being prosecuted for murder, robbery,
larceny or some other offense. This rule is found in every system
of procedure. It is the irreducible minimum. How then should
the charge show what offense is intended? What averments are
necessary? There are three ways in which the offense can be
alleged: (i) by giving the name of the offense, if either the common
law or statute has prescribed a distinctive name; (2) by citing the
statute and section or subsection thereof alleged to have been
violated, and (3) by stating so much of the definition of the offense
as is necessary to show the offense intended to be charged.
In some fifteen or more American jurisdictions, the forms pre-
scribed by the codes do contain a statement of the name of the
offense, if it have one. It seems to be quite generally held under
the other provisions of the codes in these jurisdictions that the
insertion of the name is a formal matter. Its omission will be
excused.' Or if it appears that the facts, which must also be al-
leged, do not constitute the offense named, the name will be re-
t Massachusetts Revised Laws, 1902; Chap. 218.
'Criminal Code. 55-56 V., Chap. 29; in Chap. 146, Revised Statutes of
Canada, 19o6, Part XIX.
' The Crimes Act, 1~o8. Part X in New Zealand Consolidated Statutes,
19o8, No. 32, §386 e seq. This code and the Canadian code are identical.
' Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Chap. XIX in Unrepealed General
Acts, r898, Act X, Chap. XIX.
I State v. Baldy, 17 Iowa 39 (1864).
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jected as surplusage., These forms also require a statement of
the facts constituting the particular transaction and these facts
must also be sufficiently full to identify the offense. The require-
ment for the statement of the name of the offense only complicates
the indictment in these jurisdictions, and it was too complex at
common law.
The Massachusetts Revised Laws provide that the insertion
of the name of the offense when charging some ten offenses, shall
be a sufficient statement of the offense. Why this limit was set is
not dear. The Penal Codes of New Zealand and Canada do not
give names to the offenses defined and their Procedural codes do
not. require the insertion of any names. The Criminal Procedure
Code of India' requires that the name' of the offense be stated in
the charge.
The second way in which the charge may specify the offense
for which the prosecution is brought is by a reference to the statute
alleged to have been violated. Neither at common law nor under
any statute in the United States is any reference to the particular
statute creating or defining the offense required in an indictment;
and further, if any such reference is found therein, it is rejected
as surplusage. It is not considered in determining the sufficiency
of the indictment.
The Canadian Code'@ provides that
"a count may refer to any section or subsection of any
statute creating the offense charged therein, and in estimat-
ing the sufficiency of such count the court shall have regard
to such reference."
The Indian Code" requires that
"the law and section of the law against which the offense
is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the
charge."
The individuals who have formulated other model codes of
procedure have invariably seen fit to require the insertion of the
. IState v. Howard. 66 Minn. 309 (1896); State v. Davis, 41 Iowa 311 (1875);
contra, People v. Quartarabo, 133 N. Y. Supp. 985 (1902).
$Chap. 218, §38.
'Chap. XIX, §221 (2).
1 §873, subsec. a.
"§221. subsec. 4.
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statute alleged to have been violated. The code of E. D. Lewislt
and the Draft Code prepared by H. L. Stephenh for England do
SO.
It cannot be doubted that the citation of the particular statute,
the violation of which is charged, would be of great assistance to
the accused. He or his counsel must always look up the statute
in order to prepare his defense as to the law. Under the present
procedure he must study the allegations of the indictment and then
search among numerous statutes to find what offense contain
the elements which are averred in the charge. A direct reference
to the statute would make unnecessary such search.
The charge may specify the offense committed in a third way;
namely, by alleging so much of the definition of the offense as is
necessary to show what offense is intended. This is a modification
of the common law rule which requires that the indictment shall
state all the essential elements of the offense. This common law
rule is in effect in every American jurisdiction, but no good reason
can beshown for its existenc, in the present rigorous form. There
is no reason why an indictment which contains sufficient matter
to show what offense is intended should not be sufficient to charge
such offense. The law says that nothing shall be taken by intend-
ment, when averring the essential elements of the offense. But
why should not the elements of the offense be stated by intendment
if the indictment shows what is intended? There might be some
reason for requiring the indictment to state each and every ele-
ment of the offense, if there were a corresponding rule which said
that the indictment was invalid which stated matters not essential
to a description of the offense. Then the accused would be entitled
to an acquittal if he proved that any averment of the charge did
not correspond with the actual facts. There is no such rule. The
accused is not acquitted on a charge of "wilfully" doing an act when
he proves that he did not do the act wilfully, if the statute creating
the offense does not make "wilfullness" an essential element of
the offense. The accused must now search through unessential
averments of the indictment to discover what is intended to be es-
'1 se A Draft Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, appendix, Form A.
A. i and 1287.13 See Report of Committee E, in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
VolI. ,p. 589 (1910).
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sential. But such indictment is valid, although it may be mislead-
ing in that it alleges too much matter. An indictment therefore
should not be held invalid unless it alleges so little matter as to be
misleading. The real quarrel here is with the interpretation which
the courts have put upon the use of the term "essential elements
of the offense." Different courts have given the term different
meanings, but none of them have said what should be said when
using the term in connection with indictments, namely, that the
essential elements of the offense are those which must be charged
in order to give the accused fair-notice of the offense to be charged.
If fairness to the accused be made the test of essentiality, there
can be no objection to the retention of the rule that the indictment
must state the essential elements of the offense. This change in
the definition of the term "essential elements " is not unprecedented.
Premeditated intention is an essential element of murder in the
first degree in the sense that it must be proved on the trial, but the-
majority of jurisdictions hold that it need not be alleged in the in-
dictment.1, In spite of Mr. Bishop's strenuous objections, no one
has ever contended that the omission of this element has ever de-
prived a person accused of murder of a fair trial on the merits of
the case. If an element essential to be proved may be omitted
in an indictment for the most serious offense of all, why may not
similar elements be omittcd in indictments for less serious offenses?
No American Code has any provision which permits generally
the omission of any element of the offense which must be proved
by the prosecution. The Canadian Code t , permits the amendment
of any count in which there appears
"an omission to state or a defective statement of any-
thing requisite to constitute the offense" provided that "the
accused has not been misled or prejudiced in his defence by
such error or omission."
This, in effect, makes valid an indictment which omits essential
elements, but the burden is on the state to show that such omission
has not prejudiced the accused. The Indian Code's merely re-
quires that
14 See Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, VoL II, §584.
U i 8 9 , subsec. 2.
I 1221.
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"if the law which creates the offense does not give it any
specific name, so much of the definition of the offense must be
stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which
he is charged."
Any one of these three methods of identifying the offense
would be sufficient to enable the accused to prepare his defence as
to the law. The charge which identifies the offense in one or more
of these ways, would ensure to the accused a fair trial in that re-
spect. But the accused should also be given such information in
the charge as will in the ordinary case enable him to prepare his
defense on the facts. The charge should identify the particular
transaction constituting the offense and distinguish it from other
transactions of like nature. The allegations which identify the
nature of the offense and the allegations which identify the specific
transaction are, in the nature of things, inextricably mixed in any
charge. The same averm'ents serve both functions. The question
now to be considered is, how much particularity should be added
in a charge which does charge that a certain offense has been corn.
mitted to show whit transaction is the basis of the charge. For
example: The charge alleges that the accused committed robbery;
what more should the charge state to show what robbery is intended?
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to frame general
rules, governing all classes of offenses, as to what should be stated
in order to identify the transaction. One must take up each
offense separately and decide what distinguishing features should
be emphasized in order to differentiate the particular transaction
for which the accused is to be put on trial from others of the same
type with which he or other persons may have been connected.
Without considering each offense separately, although this ought
to be done when a complete code is drafted, the following general
observations are submitted as controlling.
The time and place of the commission of the offense should
be alleged. Each offense, using the term now in the sense of the
transaction constituting an offense, occurs at a time and place
which absolutely distinguishes it from other offenses. This should
be a general rule governing all classes of offenses and is in fact the
only general rule so applicable. All other rules will necessarily
apply only in certain classes of cases and some rules such as these
are hereafter submitted. If the offense is. directed against any
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person, the name of the person should be stated or he should be
described in a manner calculated to reasonably inform the accused
which person is intended. If tie offense is directed against property,
the property should be described in a reasonable manner and the
name of the owner should be added if the property is of such
character that the description without the name of the owner does
not give the accused fair notice. If, however, the property be such
that the description differentiates if from the mass of property of
the same character, the name of the owner might well be 5mitted.
If the offense be committed in respect to some certain thing, not
property, thal thing should be specified in a reasonably accurate
manner. If the offense be directed toward no particular person,
property or thing, then the charge should specify the circum-
stances of the particular transaction in a manner which would
distinguish it from similar transactions.
In but one American jurisdiction do we find a general statute
which legalizes short forms such as the scheme outlined above
permits. This state is Massachusetts, a statute"7 of which pro-
vides that
"an indictment shall not be quashed or be considered de-
fective or insufficient if it be sufficient to enable the defendant
to understand the charge and to prepare his defense; nor shall it
be considered defective or insufficient for lack of any descrip-
tion which might be obtained by requiring a bill of particulars."
This section taken in connection with the other sections of the
statute practically embodies the ideas here set forth.
The Canadian Code is reads:
"Every count of an indictment shall contain so much
detail of the circumstances of the alleged offense as is suffi-
cient to give the accused reasonable information as to the act
or omission to be proved against him and to identify the trans-
action referred to; provided that the absence or insufficiency
of such details shall not vitiate the count."
(Note the proviso; its effect will be discussed subsequently.)
The Indian Codets reads that:
17 Rvised Laws, 1902, Chap. 218, 134.
217 3.
11222, 223.
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"the charge shall contain such particulars as to the time
and place of the alleged offense, and the person (if any) against
whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which it was com-
mitted as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice
of the matter with which he is charged.
"When the nature of the case is such that the particulars
mentioned in §§ 221 and 222 do not give the accused suffi-
cient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge
shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the
alleged offense was committed as will be sufficient for that
purpose. to
The general rules which we have proposed for determining the
sufficiency of the averments which are to enable the accused to pre-
pare his defense differ from the rules of the Canadian and Indian
Codes in this respect. These codes say that the charge shall con-
tain so much matter as is necessary to afford the accused reason-
able information in each and every case; i. e., each case is to stand
on its own merits, and if it were not for saving sections found else-
where in the code the validity of each charge would depend uporn
the particular circumstances of each particular case. The rules
here proposed make the average case the standard and do not let
each case stand or fall on its own merits.
The remedial sections of the Canadian and the Indian Codes
show how completely each case is intended to stand on its own
merits. The Indian Code'* reads:
"No error in stating either the offense or the particulars
required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state
the offense or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage
of the case as material unless the accused was in fact misled by
such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of jus-
tice."
The Canadian Code", provides:
"That the absence or insufficiency of such details of the
transaction shall not vitiate the count, and that the court
shall amend an omission to state or a defective statement of
anything requisite to constitute the offense-if the matter
omitted is proved by the evidence."
These two codes differ in that under the Canadian Code an indict-




tion be taken before trial," while under the Indian Code the formal
charge can never be quashed entirely, but the court will amend it
in all respects2" if it does not conform to the rules.
Therefore it would seem that under the Indian Code an accused
person may be put on trial without any formal charge to identify
either the offense or the transaction constituting the offense if as
a matter of fact he is or should be prepared to meet the case to be
proved against him, having obtained the requisite information at
the preliminary hearings. Under the Canadian Code, the accused
cannot be put to trial against his objection on a charge which does
not identify the offense, although he may be tried on a charge
which does not specify the transaction. Thus:.,
"Every count of an indictment shall contain and shall be
sufficient if it contains in substance, a statentent that the accu-
sed has committed some indictable offense therein specified."
This setting of a low minimum requirement, which in the one
case is really nothing, and in the other is the offense, has these ad-
vantages. It prevents delays and appeals based on technical
rules of pleading, since all motions and appeals must then be based
on the single proposition, whether the accused will be or was fairly
tried or not. It also enables the court and the prosecuting officers
to work out by practice a form of charge for each particular offense
which will give rise to the least delay in the trial of the list of cases.
The forms that would be used under such minimum requirements
would be, and it is submitted, are, in Canada, New Zealand, and
India, those forms which in the long run cause the fewest number
of postponements of trials.
Then why, if, under a system of pleading setting lower re-
quirements for the charge, fair trials and speedy punishment are
secured, should the higher requirements, that the charge shall
identify both the offense and the transaction constituting such
offense, be set? The reason is: Every state in the United States,
and the Federal Government itself, has a constitution which sets
2 R. v. Weir, L. R. 9 Q. B. 253 (1900).
33§226. "When any person is committed for trial without a charge, or
with an imperfect or erroneous charge, the court ........ may frame a charge
or add to or otherwie alter the charge, as the case may be, having regard to the
rules contained in this code as to the form of charges."
N J852.
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limitations upon any system of criminal procedure. The usual
provision which, with variations in terminology, is found in every
constitution, is that the accused person shall have the right "to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
This article will close with a full discussion of the effect of this
provision and therefore only the conclusions of the writer will be
presented here. They are as follows.
The right to demand the nature and cause would be valueless
unless it also included the obligation on the part of the state to
furnish information as to the nature and cause of the accusation
upon such demand. This right is given to the accused and irre-
spective of whether the nature of the case requires for a fair trial
that he receive that information in writing in -the particular case.
He must be given specific information even though he knows all
the facts and circumstan'ces necessary to assure him a fair trial.
The right to be informed of the nature of the accusation means that
the charge must specify some offense. The decisions state that a
formal charge specifying the offense is an absolute prerequisite
to the jurisdiction of any court of record. It therefore cannot be
waived by the accused. He may object at any stage of the pro-
ceedings to the jurisdiction of the court. Just why a statute would
not be constitutional which would provide that the court should
have jurisdiction where the accused was as a matter of fact informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation without a formal written
charge, is not clear, but that such a statute would not be consti-
tutional seems firmly established by the cases. A code which would
question that principle would give rise to much litigation on appeal.
It would therefore defeat its own purpose, namely to avoid delay
in punishment. The constitutions, therefore, set one absolute
requirement; namely, that the charge must contain sufficient
matter to identify the offense
The right to be informed of the cause of the accusation means
that the charge must specify the transaction which constitutes
the offense. This right may be waived by the accused, but if he
does not demand information as to the specific transaction, he must
be given it, regardless of whether he would or would not be tried
fairly without it. Since the accused has this right he will, in the
vast majority of cases, insist upon it, either because he conceives
the information to be necessary for a fair trial, or because he hopes
SIMPLIFIED CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS
thereby to embarrass the prosecution. It is, therefore, advisable
that the charge should, when first drawn, identify the transaction.
This will obviate the otherwise frequent delays which would occur
when the accused did, as he most frequently would, demand that
the information be given him.
Another constitutional provision compels the same minimum
requirements. In many states it is provided that the trial shall
be by indictment. The practical effect, though perhaps not the
theoretical effect, of this provision is that, before a person can be
put on trial, a grand jury must hear the evidence against him and
decide whether or not there is probable cause for prosecuting him
for some particular offense. The indictment as passed upon by
the grand jury should aver sufficient matter to show for what
offense the grand jury found probable cause to send the case to the
petit jury. To permit trial upon an indictme-it which did not
specify the offense would not be trial by indictment. Whether
the constitutions require that the indictment should identify the
transaction as well as the offense is questionable. It would seem
that they do not, but no cases have flatly decided that it would or
would not be trial by indictment to put the accused on trial on an
indictment which merely charged the commission of a certain
offense without stating matter to differentiate in some manner the
facts constituting the offense from like facts. An analysis of the
cases would seem to prove that such indictment would be valid
if it be made part of a system of procedure which would also give
the accused the right to obtain the particulars on demand.
Thus far we have discussed what the formal charge should
contain. The next question is, what should be done if the charge
does not conform to these minimum requirements? The conclu-
sions of the writer on this question are as follows:
If the charge does not sufficiently identify the offense (as
distinguished from the transaction) the charge should be set aside
or quashed no matter at what stage in the case the defect is pointed
out. The whole case must then be begun anew. This rule may
not be desirable and undoubtedly will cause many delays and re-
trials in cases where the offense was not indicated but substantial
justice was more or less done in the trial. The constitutional
provisions previously discussed however render such a rule im-
perative.
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If the charge does not contain sufficient averments to identify
the transaction and so enable the accused to prepare his defense
as to the facts, the accused should have the right to compel the pro-
secution to furnish him with such information as is desirable for
that purpose. This may be done by giving him the right to a bill
of particulars. Under the proposed code the bill of particulars
will differ in certain respects from that known to the common law.
At common law the bill of particulars is given to the accused as a
matter of grace on the part of the trial court to supplement the in-
formation contained in the indictment. It is no part of the plead-
ings and so no legal objection can be raised as to its sufficiency.
The appellate courts will not review the action of the trial court
in granting or refusing the bill, except in cases of gross abuse of
the discretion. The reason back of these common law rules was
that the indictment was. considered as fully identifying both the
offense and the transaction constituting the offense. Theoretically
the accused never needed any information not contained in the
indictment for a fair trial.s
Under the proposed code, the accused is given an absolute
right to a bill of particulars, amending and supplementing the charge,
to the extent that the bill should satisfy his constitutional right to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He
may also be given information not required by the constitution,
but his right thereto will be discretionary with the court and shall
be dependent upon the circumstances of the case. The bill of par-
ticulars will be made part of the record and will supplement and
amend the formal charge first presented. Objection can be taken
to its sufficiency on the ground that the transaction set out therein
does not constitute the offense charged as a matter of law and,
when that is so, the entire charge may be quashed, if the prosecuting
officer is unable or unwilling to file a supplemental bill which will
cure the defects of the previous bill
Thus there may be two or more separate documents, one of
which identifies the offense and the other identifies the transaction,
which together on the record state the entire charge against the
accused. The constitutional rights of the accused to be informed
-of the nature and cause of the accusation against him are thus
2s Sherrick v. State. 167 Ind. 345 (19o6).
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preserved. It would seem that the accused may waive his right
to be informed of the transaction and he should be held to have
waived that right where he fails to ask for a bill of particulars at
the proper time. Under this code, the proceedings would be de-
layed in cases where the charge failed to identify the transaction,
the extent of the delay being dependent upon the circumstances
,of each particular case, since it would be only so long as would be
necessary for the accused to obtain his witnesses to meet those
facts which were for the first time brought to his attention. Thus,
if the preliminary hearings should disclose the entire case against
the accused, and a formal charge should be drawn which identifies
the offense and not the transaction, and the accused should later
insist upon a bill of particulars to satisfy his constitutional rights,
in such a case no delay would occur in the putting of the accused
on trial, since he would be in actual receipt of all the information
-against him and could be fairly tried without any delay. If, on
the other hand, the bill of particulars gave the accused his first
notice of the transaction to be proved against him, he would be
-entitled to such postponement as would be necessary for a fair
trial. In no case would the entire proceedings be dismissed nor
would the prosecution be brought anew when the first formal
charge failed to identify the transaction, as happens under the
present law.
As has been noticed, one section ' of the Canadian Code pro-
vides that the absence of sufficient details to identify the transacton
referred to shall not vitiate any count. Since these details may be
necessary for a fair trial, other sections" provide that
"the court may, if satisfied that it is necessary for a fair
trial, order that the prosecutor shall furnish a particular,-
(a) of what is relied on in support of any charge of perjury,
the making oi a false oath or of a false statement, fabricat-
ing evidence, or subornation, or procuring the commission of
any such offenses;
(b) or of any false pretences or any fraud charged;
(c) of any attempt or conspiracy by fraudulent means;
(d) stating what passage in any book, pamphlet, news-
paper or other printing or writing, are relied on in suport of a
1' 853.
§J859, 86o.
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charge of selling or exhibiting an obscene book, pamphlet,
neswpaper, printing or writing;
(e) further describing any document or words the subject
of a charge;
(f) further describing the means by which any offense-
was committed;
(g) further describing any person, place or thing referred
to in any indictment.
(S. 86o) "When any particular as aforesaid is delivered
S. . .it shall be entered in the record, and the trial pro-
ceed in all respect as if the indictment had been amended in
conformity with such particulars."
Thus, in Canada, the charge may consist of an indictment and
a bill of particulars amending and supplementing the indictment..
It is also provided"s that:
"in determining whether a particular is required or not
. . . . the Court may have regard to the depositions"
which are not part of the record, but to which the accused had ac-.
cess. This means that the accused has no right to a bill of par-
ticulars unless justice and fairness require it. Our constitutions
require that he be given such a right regardless of fairness to him.
The Indian Code accomplishes the same result without the
use of a bill of particulars. A certain sections reads that:
"Any court may alter or add to any charge at any time
before judgment is pronounced,"
and subsequent sections give the court power to proceed immedi--
ately with the trial or to postpone the case as the interests of jus-
tice require.
In but one state of the United States is the bill of particulars
used to accomplish the purposes which it accomplishes under the
model code: namely, to cure lack of sufficient identification of the
transaction in the indictment. One section'.of the Massachusetts
statute provides that
"an indictment shall not be considered defective or in-
sufficient for lack of any description or information which




might be obtained by requiring a bill of particulars as pro-
vided in section thirty-nine"
which section reads in part as follows:
"The court may .. ..... order the prosecution to
file a statement of such particulars as may be necessary to
give the defendant and the court reasonable knowledge of the
nature and grounds of the crime charged; and if it has final
jurisdiction of the crime, shall so order at the request of the
accused if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly,
substantially and formally set out."
"The cases treat the bill of particulars given under this section as
part of the formal charge, and the indictment and the bill of par-
ticulars together are valid if they contain sufficient matter to satisfy
the constitutional requirements.l
The right of the prosecution to freely amend and supplement
the charge will not, under the model code, cease when the accused
is put on trial. If a variance appears between the evience off-
ered and those allegations of the indictment or the bill of particu-
lars which serve to identify the transaction, the indictment and the
bill of particulars may be amended to conform to the proof. "And
such amendment will be made regardless of whether the accused
is thereby prejudiced in his defense or not. He will, however, be
entitled to a postponement of the case if he can show that he is
surprised by the evidence offered and is therefore unable to meet
it. In that it permits amendment under all circumstances, the
proposed code would differ from the present statutes permitting
amendment of the indictment in case of variance. The majority
of statutes are modeled after the English statute" and the drafts-
men of these various statutes permitting amendment of variances
have but rarely gone the fulll ength of permitting amendment of all
variances between proof and those allegations of the charge which
identify the transaction. Instead of providing that all such vari-
ances shall be amendable they have enumerated certain allega-
tions which do identify the transaction, as distinguished from the
offense, and provided that these variances shall be amendable.
Thus the English statute reads:
2 Comm. v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 320 (i9o3); Comm. v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. zoo
(1907).
U 14 & IS Vict., Chap. ioo, §x (1851).
56 UVIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"Whenever on the trial of any indictment for any felony
or misdemeanor there shall appear to be any variance between
the statement and the evidence offered in proof thereof;
"In the name of any county, division, city, borough,
town, corporate, parish, township or place mentioned or de-
scribed in any such statement;
"Or in the name or description of any person or persons
or body politic or corporate, therein stated or alleged to be the
owner or owners of any property, real or personal, which
shall form the subject of any offense charged therein;
"Or in the name or description of any person or persons
or body politic or corporate, therein stated or alleged to be in-
jured or damaged or intended to be injured or damaged by the
commission of such offense;
"Or in the christian name or surname, or both christian
name and surname, or other description whatsoever, of any
person or persons whomsoever therein named or described;
"Or in the name or description of any matter or thing
whatsoever therein named or described, or in the ownership of
any property named or described therein;
" It shall and may be lawful for the court before which the
trial shall be had, if it shall consider such variance not material
to the merits of the case, and that the defendant cannot be pre-
judiced thereby in his defense upon such merits, to order such
indictment to be amended according to the proofs, by some
officer of the court or other person."
This is a fairly complete list of those allegations which identify
the transaction, but some were omitted. In Reg. v. Smith,33 it
was held that the section did not authorize amendment where, in
an indictment for false pretence, it was alleged that the defendant
had pretended that he had served a justice notice on a certain
person, and the proof showed that he had said that he had served
the notice on the landlady of that person.
The statutes in effect in the various jurisdictions vary in the
number and character of the allegations of details which may be
amended. Only three American statutes go the full length, under
any interpretation thereof, of making possible the amendment of
all those allegations which serve merely to identify the transaction.
The Michigan*, and Wisconsinss statutes permit amendment:
3 6 Cox. 31 (1852); contra, but doubtful, Rex v. Byers, 19o7, 71 J. P. 205;
Rex v. Jackson, 4 S. R. 732 (N. S. Wales, 19o4).
u Act 77, 1855, p. 141 in Michigan Compiled Laws, t897, 111.922
"' Wisconsin Statutes, 14703.
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"in all cases wherever the variance between the facts
alleged in the indictment and those proved by the evidence
are not material to the merits of the case."
The term "material to the merits of the case" is indefinite,
but it would seem that only those allegations which identify the
offense are material. The South Carolina statute does exactly
what the proposed statute will do in a section" which permits the
amendment of all variances "provided such amendment does not
change the nature of the offense charged." The nature of the
,offense charged is shown by the averments which identify the of-
fense, and so all other allegations are amendable.
The Canadian Codes" permits the amendment of variances in
all cases where the prejudice created thereby may be removed by
postponement; and the Indian Codeze says that "any court may
alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pro-
nounced."
All of the statutes provide for postponement of the trial "to
be had before the same or another jury," in cases where prejudice
and surprise arise under the newly disclosed state of facts, and a
similar right should be given the accused under the proposed code.
The proposed reforms do not involve any changes in the fun-
damental principles which now govern the procedure by formal
accusation. When the rules here advocated are applied to pro-
cedure by information, the sole test of the sufficiency of such in-
formation will be, does it fairly apprise the accused of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him? If an information does
not fairly inform the accused of the cause of the accusation, which
may happen when it fails to set out the details of the transaction
or when such details are incorrectly set out, the information may
be supplemented and amended at once, only so much delay in the
trial resulting as is necessary to insure a fair trial to the defendant.
The necessity for recommencing the entire prosecution will be done
away with.
Nor does the reform herein advocated involve any change in
the principles governing procedure by indictment. The grand
jury will still hear evidence as to the transaction constituting the
"Criminal Code of South Carolina, 185.
3 §8.
* 1227.
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offense and in all probability it will be the same evidence which will
later be presented to the petit jury. There is no likelihood that the
prosecuting officer will ever prove to the grand jury that A murdered
B at a certain time and place and by certain means and then come
before the petit jury and prove that A murdered C at another
time and place and by different means.
With the usual provisions in regard to the indorsement of the
witnesses' names on the indictment, any right which the accused
may have to be tried for the same transaction for which he Was in-
dicted is fully protected. The accused will, however, be deprived
of the use of the indictment when he attempts to show that there
were two distinct transactions. The presumption will be that the
grand jury heard evidence as to the transaction proved at the
trial and based their indictment thereon, regardless of whether
the indictment .contains any allegations to show that such is the
case, or whether the allegations therein stated would seem to show
that the contrary was so. At common law it was said that the
indictment was invalid which failed to allege the particulars of
the transaction with such particularity that there could be no doubt
as to the transaction intended to be charged; and further, if 41-e in-
dictment was more particular than the rules required, it was con-
ceived that the grand jury could not have intended a transaction
identical, in all respects but one, with the transaction set forth.
Thus an indictment which charged the larceny of a watch from A.
B. was valid and under it the defendant could be convicted of
stealing a gold watch from A. B. and the court would not hear
evidence that A. B. had had a silver watch stolen at the same time
and that the grand jury had intended to indict the accused for
stealing the silver watch. The presumption was that the 'grand
jury intended to indict for the theft proved. If, however, the
grand jury charged that the accused stole a silver watch, and it
was proved that he had stolen a gold watch, which was the only
watch that A. B. had ever possessed, the court refused to presume
that the grand jury intended to charge the theft of the gold watch,
and took the view that the grand jury meant exactly what was
averred in the indictment. This view has been changed by the
statutes which permit amendments in the names and descriptions
of persons, places and things, when the facts proved do not corre-
spond with the facts alleged. The presumption that the state of
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facts proved is the state of facts intended to be charged by the
grand jury has thus been extended to cases were the indictment
would seem to show otherwise. Under the proposed code, as under
any of the statutes permitting amendment of the indictment in
cases of variance, the accused may in the very exceptional case be
deprived entirely of the use of the indictment as evidence of what
transaction the grand jury intended to indict him for. The op-
portunity for indicting a man for one transaction and proving
another at the trial could arise only when the accused had com-
mitted numerous offenses of like nature and even he would be pro-
tected in such a case by the necessity of calling the same witnesses
before both the grand and the petit juries.
The legislative bodies of the jurisdictions whose statutes have
for the most part been taken as examples are not restrained by any
constitutional provisions from setting any form of criminal accusa-
tion which is desirable. Each and every legislative body in the
United States is restrained to a certain extent by the constitutions.
Therefore it might well be that the procedure permissible in Canada,
New Zealand and India, could never be put into operation in the
Federal or other jurisdictions of the United States. It is therefore
necessary to determine from a study of the cases, just what limits
.are set to the powers of the various legislatures to prescribe the
rules which shall govern the formal accusations.
It is impossible to reconcile all the cases which deal with the
constitutionality of statutes which change the common law rules
governing the allegations which should be found in an indictment.
It is even impossible to reconcile on theory the cases in any one
of the majority of jurisdictions. If we study the cases in the courts
of any jurisdiction where a considerable number of cases have arisen
dealing with the constitutional question, we find that the court has
enunciated a theory in one case which it never noticed in another
case, or has said that a certain principle was controlling, which
principle was never controlling at common law. Take the United
-States Supreme Court. In ex parle Bain,"f the court said that the
provision of the United States constitution requiring procedure by
indictment in certain cases, prohibited any changing of the body
*of any indictment. In this case the change was the striking out
3 121 U. S. z (1887).
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of an averment which was clearly surplusage; and under all the-
common law authorities this decision would seem to be wrong.
But the theory of the court seemed to be that a bill found by the
grand jury is not a constitutional indictment unless it distinctly
shows on what transaction they based their finding. The indictment
in the case alleged that the accused did certain acts with intent
to deceive A and B and C and D and E and others. The intent
to deceive A was neither criminal nor material; so the trial court
struck it out. The Supreme Court said that the indictment was un-
constitutional on the ground that more than one of the grand
jurors might have been satisfied that the act was done with intent
to deceive A, but not convinced as to the intent to deceive the others,
and so the accused might be tried for what the grand jury did not.
determine and such trial would not be trial by indictment. The-
court never cofisidered whether, if the grand jury had originally
found the indictment as it was when amended, they might not have-
based their finding on an intend to defraud B and the accused be
tried for an intent to defraud C and clearly under their first holding-
the latter case would not be trial by indictment; but when this.
question was clearly presented to them in Rosen v. U. S.,"o in which
case the indictment was for the mailing of obscene matter to the
extent of twelve pages, and the accused insisted that the indictment.
should show what particular pages were found to be obscene by
the grand jury, the court said "that he was not entitled to know
what passed in the conferences of grand jurors." The dissenting
judges adopted the view 6f the accused, but the case was unani-
mously affirmed in Price v. U. S.41 Thus a certain principle was
enunciated as prohibiting amendments to indictments, which was.
repudiated when considering the sufficiency of indictments.
Similar inconsistencies may be found in the decisions of al-
most every state in the Union, and the court which does most
consistently follow the rules which other courts pretend to follow
has become the "awful example." The reference is to Texas.
It would seem as though the only uniform-test of constitutionality-
should be and is "Was the accused fairly informed of the charge
that he was to meet"? And the decision of this will rest largely
on the facts of each individual case. This view is being frankly
4e 161 U. S. 29 (1895).
a 16S U. S. 311 (1896).
SIMPLIFIED CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS
recognized and applied. Recent cases show less regard for tech-
nicalities, for rules said to be applicable in all cases. Take a-very
late case in the United States Supreme Court."2 Day, J., says:
"It is elementary that an indictment, in order to be good
under the Federal Constitution and laws, shall advise the ac-
cused of the nature and cause of the accusation and prepare
him for his trial and that, after judgment, he may bea ble to
plead the record and judgment in bar of further prosecu-
tion for the-same offense."
And later on, he says:
-"As to the objection that the charge was so indefinite that
the accused could not plead the record and conviction in bar
of another prosecution, it is sufficient to say that in such cases
it is the right of the accused to resort to parol testimony to
show the subject matter of the former conviction and such
practice is not infrequently necessary. "a
Thus the second of the two standards first enunciated is re-
pudiated in the same opinion and later on the court says:
"In the absence of a demand for a bill of particulars, we
think this description (given in the indictment) sufficiently
advised the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him."
The inference from these wordla is that the test of the sufficiency
of the information given varies with each particular case and may
be dependent upon information actually had by the accused, but
not fotw.d in the charge.
This case is fairly illustrative of the more liberal attitude of
the courts of all jurisdictions. Fairness to the accused is coming
to be almost the sole test, and it would seem as though any reform
in procedure will be held constitutional which insures to the ac-
cused full opportunity to secure all the information requisite to a
fair trial
The remainder of this article will be devoted to showing-
examples both at common law and under various statutes of appli-
cations of the various proposals previously set forth. There will
4 Bartel V. U. S., 227 U. S. 427 (1913).
4 Citing U. S. v. Claflin, 13 Blatchf. 178 (U. S., 1875); Dunbar v. U. S.,
i56 U. S. 185 (1895); Trubbs v. U. S., to5 Fed. Rep. 59 (1900).
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be no consistent attempt to discuss the numerous cases which have
been decided on theories other than those here enunciated. Such
a discussion would fill a laige volume. Therefore, with but inci-
dental notice of the cases decided contra, the cases which support
the theories of this paper will be discussed.
Before entering upon a discussion of the cases, the following
premises are submitted for consideration. First: The constitu-
tions require no greater particularity than did the common law.
Any form of averment which was sufficient at common law is suffi-
cient under the constitutions of the several jurisdictions. Num-
erous cases might be cited to show that the provisions of the con-
stitutions require common law exactness in criminal procedure."4
And if common law sufficiency is required by the constitutions,
common law sufficiency is all that is required. If, therefore, it
is possible to show that in certain classes of cases, certain forms of
allegation were sufficient, that is some evidence that the same
forms should be sufficient under the constitutions in other classes
of cases. Another premise is that any form of averment which
imparts to the accused as much really important information as
did the common law forms, is also constitutional. This premise
is not so firmly established as the other, but cases supporting it
will be cited subsequently.
Let us apply these principles to the rules herein set forth.
The first proposition was to indicate the offense, as distinguished
from the transaction constituting the offense, by giving the name
of the offense, or by referring to the statute violated, or by stating
so much of the definition of the offense as is necessary to show
what offense is intended. First, is the identification of the offense,
by the name thereof, constitutional?
At common law there are four offenses, in charging which it
is sufficient to use simply the name of the offense. These of-
"English v. State, 31 Fed. Rep. 340 (1893); Hewitt v. State, 25 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 722 (86o); Mott v. State, 29 Ark. 147 (1874). Thesearea fewof the more
extreme cases.
4S See Archbold, Crim. Pr. & Pl., 24 Ed., p. 1224.
4" Rex v. Maso, 2 T. R. 581 (1788); Comm. v.- Davis, ix Pick. 432 (Mass.,
1831).
47 Rex. v. Urlyn, 2 Sand. (Wim. Ed.) 308, in notes; See Comm. v. McNar.
mara, t16 Mass. 39o (z874).
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lenses are affray," barratry," being a common scold,4T and being
a common night walker."s In these cases, averring the legal effect.
of acts is held to be a sufficient statement of the acts constituting
the offense. These cases show that the principle that the function
-of the indictment is to state facts, not law, was not universally
-applicable, even at common law. The necessity for the use of
certain technical words in indictments for certain offenses also
-shows that the rule is not universal "that a pleading need only
-state facts, not law."," Whether an act amounts to a felony and
was therefore "feloniously" done is a pure conclusion of law, but
the -indictment was bad which did not so characterize the doing of
the act."s What the words "murder," "ravish," and "feloniously
take and carry away" mean in indictments for murder, ' rape,st
.and larceny," respectively, is a pure conclusion of law from facts
not alleged, and yet these words are sufficient to convey their legal
meaning and must be used. In another class of cases the same
manner of stating offenses is held sufficient. In charging burglary,
the intent may be alleged in one of two ways. It is sufficient to
allege that the accused broke and entered "with intent to commit -
larceny therein,""1 or all the elements of the intended larceny must
be fully disclosed.", Thus the use of the term "larceny" in the
-one case is sufficient to convey all the elements of the offense required
in the other. If -certain words can be used to convey their full
legal meaning in certain cases, why not all?
Statutes which would permit this mode of charging generally
.are infrequent. An English statutes" was given that effect in
England,'l but the same statute in Wisconsin" and Michigan"
4 State v. Dowers, 4s N. H. 543 (1864).
49 Bishop, New Cr. Pro. §329 (2).
" Evington v. People, 181 Ill. 408 (1899); Reg. v. Gray, 9 Cox. C. C. 417
(1864).
u Dy. 261 a.
i Staundf. 26 a.
u4 B!. Comm. 305.
H People v. Shaber, 32 Cal. 36 (x867).
"s Barnhard v. State, 154 Ind. 177 (r9oo).
w2 Geo. IV., c. 64, §2 (1826).
'l Reg. v. Goldsmith, L. IL 2 C. C. R. 74 (1873); Reg. v. Stroulger 17 Q
.B. D. 327 (t886).
u Statutes, i898, §4669.
*Compiled Laws, 1897, §11924.
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was not so interpreted.- There is, however, one case flatly in,,
point, which upholds the constitutionality of this proposal. By a
statute" the following form of indictment was made sufficient to.
charge perjury; namely (omitting formal parts) that the accused
at a certain time and place appeared as a witness in a case between
parties named, then and there being heard before a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, and committed the crime of perjury by testi-.
fying as follows (here set out testimony) which said testimony was
material to the issue then and there pending in said proceeding.
The objection was taken that this form did not allege that the
testimony was false, that it was given wilfully and corruptly, or -
that an oath was lawfully administered. But the court said:41
"The whole matter thus resolves itself into this question:
Does the allegation that the party charged has committed
perjury, ex vi ternzini, charge all the particulars, which by law-
constitute that crime?
"When a party is charged with having committed per-.
jury, in testimony, as a witness. . . he is thereby directly
charged with all that goes to make up the offense. He cannot
be found guilty of the perjury charged until evidence is pro-
duced which proves him guilty of every particular embraced
in the definition of perjury.
"Such an indictment gives sufficient notice to the accused
of 'the nature and cause of the accusation against him' re-
quired by the constitution"
This is a clear cut dcci.ion that the name of an offense may import
all the elements of the offense."
A Massachusetts statute"* provides that the names of certain
offenses shall be sufficient to convey all the elements of the offense.
The words are declared thereby to be words of legal art. As re-
gards "larceny-stealing" the statute was held constitutional in
Comm. v. Kelly;' and as regards "murder," in Comm. v. Snell.,
The other names have not been passed upon.
"0 Enders v. State, 20 Mich. 233 (1870).
"1 Maine R. S., c. 123, IS.
' State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137 (1871).
63 Similar reasoning, State v. Casey, 45 Me. 435 (1858): con(ra, Brender V..
State, 12 Tex. Cr. R. 613 (1882).
'4 Mass. R. L., c. 218 138.
1 184 Mass. 320 (19o3); Comm. v. King, 202 Mass. 379 (1909).
" Comm. v. Snell, 189 Mass. 13 (19o5).
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In Illinois, it has been held that a charge that the accused
"did obtain from A. B. his money by means and by use of the con-
fidence game" was good and sufficient and under it any form of
swindling transaction might be proved, since by legal interpreta-
tion any such swindle was a "confidence game.""?
The next proposition was that the allegation that the accused
violated a certain statute, or section or subsection thereof, should
be a sufficient allegation that he committed the offense therein
defined. For this proposition there are no common law precedents
and but one statutory precedent. A statute in Rhode Island"
forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors except as provided in another
statute and an indictment negatived the exception thus, "Said
sale and delivery not then and there being as provided in section
sixty of chapter eighty-seven of the Public Statutes of said State."
The court in State v. Walshe, stated that the exceptions had to be
negatived, but that this was a sufficient negativing thereof. The
exceptions formed an essential element of the offense and if one
essential element may be set out by reference to a statute why not
all of them?
Being -without precedent the proposition must be considered
entirely from a practical viewpoint. The general rule in charging
statutory offenses is that it is sufficient to charge facts constituting
the offense in words of the statute.
7'
"Every indictment found by a grand jury shall be deemed
sufficiently technical and correct which alleges and charges
the offense in the language of the statute creating the offense,
or so charges the offense that it may be understood by the
jury."
There are, of course, numerous exceptions but the general rule is
as above stated.
In order to test the sufficiency of an inditr ent for a statu-
tory offense, or to prepare his defense as to the '.w, the accused,
or his counsel, must always have recourse to the .atute, as found
'U People v. Depew, 237 Ill. 579 (i909); contra, Rode. 1;. ". State, i2 Tex.
Cr. R. 552 (1882).h
01 Pub. Laws, Cap. 378, 1i of Apr. 13, 1883.
0 14 R. 1. 507 (1884).
10 See Joyce on Indictments, §371.
n People v. Bolen, 184 111 338 (19oo), per Philips, J
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in the books. One is frequently struck with the diligence displayed
by counsel in studying the statute and determining upon the mean-
ing of the terms used in order to find flaws in the indictment. He
has no difficulty in discovering the essentials of the offense as de-
fined by the statute and whether such essentials are averred in the
indictment. He always stands ready to inform the court of the
contents of the statute. Would he be less diligent in informing
his client?
But it will be said that there are defendants without attornies
and with no access to the statute books, who could not know with
what offense they are charged. Would such defendants be any
worse off than they are now? They now have no opportunity to
test whether the facts charged constitute a crime. The court is
supposed to see to that now; could not the court see to it that they
are informed of what the statute forbids?
By requesting a bill of particulars, the accused person would
be able to secure all the information now found in the indictment.
Such a method of allegation would not change the rules as to what
must be proved before the grand jury or what must be proved to
the petit jury. The only difference would be that, whereas the
accused now goes to the statute to find out whether the facts
charged constitute an offense, he would, if this proposal were adopted,
go to the statute to find what facts were charged. The accused
would not be any more hampered in the preparation of his defense
than he is at present. If fairness to the accused is the real test
this proposal is constitutional.
The next proposition was that it would be sufficient to charge
the offense by stating merely so much of the definition of the offense
as is necessary to show what offense is intended. This involves a
repudiation of the alleged common law principle that the indictment,
to be valid, must show that an offense has been committed; that
the facts stated must not be consistent with the innocence of the
accused. It also requires a different interpretation of the term
itessential elements" in the rule that "the indictment must state
the essential elements of the offense." Many cases can be cited
in many jurisdictions which hold that this repudiation and change
in interpretation would be unconstitutional. The only thing
which can be done to meet these cases is to show other cases where
the application of these rules in their present form would have
-compelled decisions contra to those actually given.
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When one attempts to determine from a study of the cases
just what the rule, that the indictment must state all the essential
elements of the offense, means, one is lost in a maze of hopelessly
contradictory and conflicting statements. Some courts say that
it means that the indictment must show against any possible in-
ference to the contrary that the accused has committed a certain
offense for which he can be punished.72 This statement is not true
and never has been true. At common law no indictment stated
that the accused was more than seven years of Age or that he was
sane at the time of the commission of the offense. These things
were presumed; but the courts refused to presume other matters
just as easily presumable. Take the case of alleging intent. In-
tent is an element of almost every offense, yet it is sufficient to
allege the completed acts constituting the offense. The law pre-
sumes that everyone intends the natural and logical consequences
of his acts here.n Take tile specific offense of larceny. Parke, B.,1
says that to establish the offense of larceny at common law there
must be proved the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying
away by the accused of the mere personal goods of another, from
any place, with an intent to convert them to his (the taker's) use
permarently, without color of right, and to make them his own
property, without the consent of the owner. The form of indict-
ment is that "A. B. feloniously did take, steal and carry away, one
gold watch of the goods and chattels of A. B." In this indictment
the word "steal" therefore charged the wrongfulness and -fraud
of the taking and carrying away, the intent to deprive the owner
permanently of his property, the lack of consent on the part of the
owner, and the absence of color of right, (if all the essential elements
are charged) the reason for inferring that "steal" meant all these
elements being that one could not "steal" unless those elements
were all present in the transaction. But one could not "steal"
unless the thing stolen was personal property and belonged to
some one other than the accused; none the less the courts refused to
draw these further inferences.?&
n Barnhart v. State, 154 Ind. 181 (goo), per Baker, J.
73 Comm. v. Hersey, 2 Allen 173 (Mass., z861).
71 In Reg. v. Holloway, 2 Car. & K. 491 (1849).
7" Personal property, Reg. v. Cox, i Car. & K. 494 (1844); ownership, Barn-
hart v. State, 154 Ind. 177 (19oo); Emmonds v. State, 87 Ala. 12 (x888); contra,
Reed v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 136 (1893).
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Perhaps the rule that exceptions must be negatived, when they
are essential elements of the offense, will throw some light on the
subject. A man cannot commit rape of his own wife, except as
principal in the second degree, nor yet can commit fornication or
adultery with her. So it would seem that marriage between the
prosecutrix and the accused should be negatived in these three
cases. But the marriage need not be negatived in charging rape,"
although in charging fornication and adultey it must. 77 When we
turn our attention to the negativing of exceptions found in sta-
tutes we get into an even more hopeless muddle. An exception
in the enacting clause, or incorporated thereinto by reference
must be negatived as an essential element of the offense. This is
one way of stating the rule, and the courts struggle with the ques-
tion-When is a reference sufficient to incorporate?n But some-
times exceptions in the enacting clause need not be negatived.7
Compare indictments for common law offenses and for similar
statutory offenses. . An indictment under a statute making it
criminal to procure the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, "unless
such miscarriage is necessary to save her life," must negative the
exception." But an indictment for murder need negative no
excuse or justification.-n
This discussion of what are the essential elements of offenses
is vague and indefinite, but it is no more vague and uncertain than -
are the expressions of the various courts when dealing with the subject.
The whole problem is "up in the air." If any case be cited as
proving that such and such circumstance is an element of the offense,
other cases can always be cited showing that the same or a corre-
sponding element, though just as necessary to be proved, is not
an essential element of another class of crimes.
It is impossible to find many common law precedents for the
proposition that an indictment should be sufficient which con-
tains so much of the definition of the offense as is necessary to show
what offense is intended, omitting in many instances what the
76 Rex. v. Allen. 2 Moody 179 (184o).
7' Comm. v. Murphy, 2 Allen t63 (Mass., 1861)..
? Joyce on Indictments, 139o, citing U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168 (U. S.,
1872); State v. Norton, 45 Vt. 258 (z865); etc.
nState v. Bush, t3 R. I. 198 (1881).
,State v. Aiken, 109 Iowa 643 0899).
sComm. v. Hersey, 2 Allen 173 (Mass., 1861).
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courts have held to be essential elements of that offense. At com-
mon law, the usage in charging the more ordinary offenses was to
use some single word which had been held sufficient to convey
many of the essential elements, such as "feloniously steal," in
charging larceny, "with malice aforethought murder" in charging
murder, "ravish" in charging rape. Holding that these words
stated the elements, the courts were not constrained to hold that
-any elements might-be omitted. But when statutory crimes were
-created, the legislatures failed to provide that certain words should
similarly be words of art to convey the elements of the statutory
-offenses and the rule was applied that all the elements must be
distinctly stated in an indictment for a statutory offense.
There can be but little doubt that it would be as fair to put
an accused person on trial on an indictment which shows what
offense is intended as it is to put him to trial upon the present
common law indictments. His notice of the facts to be proved
against him will be just as complete. The accused is now presumed
to know the meaning of the words "murder," "ravish," "common
barrator," and so on. It is a no more violent presumption to
presume that he knows all the elements of an offense indicated.
But it will be said that the grand jury must find all the elements,
and without an averment of them, what assurance is there that they
did hear evidence on them all? The answer to this is, that the
grand jury never does find all the elements. They hear nothing
in regard to those elements which lie particularly in the knowledge
*of the accused. They do determine that the seller of liquors had
no license. They hear no evidence as to whether or not he did not
have some excuse or justification which would relieve his acts of
criminality.
Compare these two cases. An indictment for bigamy must
negative any legal presumption of death of the former spouse if
such exception be contained in the enacting clause of the statute
defining the offense." But if it be found in another section of the
statute, there is no necessity for negativing it." So far as the
accused was concerned the offense was exactly the same in each
case, and if fairness to him required that the legal presumption of
"Hutchins v. State, 28 Ind. 34 (1867).
"People v. Priestly, xi8 Pac. Rep. 965 (Cal., i9ti).
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death should be negatived in one case, it also required the negation
in the other.
The constitutional right of the accused to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him requires that he be given
fair notice that he may prepare his defense, and a discussion of the
cases which hold that forms of accusation which do omit essential
elements are constitutional will aid in the determination of whether
this proposal is practical or not. The simplest illustration will
be given first. As has been pointed out the necessity for negativing
an exception, excuse or proviso depends upon how closely it is
connected with the definition of the offense, which is the same thing
as whether or not it is to be found in the enacting clause of the
statute creating the offense or connected therewith. No exception
found in a separate statute" or in a separate or distinct clause of
the same statute- need be negatived. It is therefore possible for
every offense to be so defined by statute, that, although the offense
is exactly the same.as at present, the indictment need not negative
a single exception. The exceptions are just as essential to an under-
standing of the offense whether they be found in the enacting
clause or in subsequent sections. Constitutionally, they need not
be negatived if found distinct from the enacting clause; and,
constitutionally, it should be possible to omit the negation if they
be found in the enacting clause. It has been so held in a cases' in
which a statute, providing that no negative allegations of any kind
need be averred in any complaint under a law forbidding the sale
of intoxicating liquors, was held constitutional, on the theory that
since the legislature could change the burden of averring and
proving negative allegations by placing the exceptions in another
portion of the same statute, it could "accomplish the same result
by direct and original enactment. '
A similar principle which would permit very general charges.
also exists. When an offense is prohibited in general terms in.
one section of the statute, and in another entirely distinct section,
the acts are specified of which the offense consists, it is not necessary
" Comm. v. Shannihan, 145 Mass. 99 (1887); State v. Streiter, 81 Atl. Rep
922 (Vt., 1911).
"SState v. Broeder, 9o Mo. App. x56 (19o); Mayer v. State, 64 N. J. L.
323 (1900).
sl State v. Beswick, 13 R. 1. 211 1,883).
27 For a legislative claim of a rght to deal directly with averments of nega-
tive allegations, see Mass. R. L., 1902, C. 218, §37.
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that anything but the general description should be set out in an
indictment." If by changing the form of the statute creating
the offense the legislature can make general charges sufficient, it
can constitutionally accomplish the same result by direct enactment.
That the indictment need not, under our constitutions, directly
state what is to be proved may be shown by another class of cases.
The statutes defining what is commonly known as the crime of
obtaining by false pretences, in some jurisdictions, call such offense
larceny, and the courts have held that a common law count for
larceny may be sustained by proof of false pretences. The ele-
ments of common law larceny and of false pretences are very
different, but the cases hold that "take, steal and carry away"
charges larceny and larceny includes false pretences and therefore
the accused is adequately forwarned." And similarly a conviction.
may be had in West Virginia on an indictment charging simple
larceny, "not only for simple larceny but for receiving and con-
cealfng stolen goods, obtaining under false pretence, or embezzle-
ment."" This is because statute law declares these offenses lar-
ceny. It is obvious that only the elements of simple larceny are
alleged by sucn indictment. In Massachusetts a statute already
noted" makes a charge of "stealing" equivalent to a charge of
larceny, embezzlement and obtaining by false pretences, and this
was held constitutional." The accused person is held to be fully
protected from surprise by his right to demand a bill ofparticulars.or
The most complete and universal substantiation of the propo-
sition that any form of charge which as a matter of fact gives the
accused person fair notice is constitutional is to be found in indict-
ments which charge the most serious offense known to the law,
murder in the first degree. As is generally known, the American
States, almost without exception, have by statute divided the offense
of common law murder into two degrees. The earliest statute to-
that effect and the one that may be taken as typical of all the others
was passed in Pennsylvania in 1794." It reads:
8 State v. Casey, 45 Me. 435 (1858).
1 Anable v. Comm., 24 Grat. 563 (Va., 1873).
"State v. Lewis, 72 S. E. Rep. 475 (W. Va., 1911).
"Mass. R. L., 1902, C. 218, §38.
" Comm. v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 320 (1903).
" State v. Lewis, 72 S. E. Rep. 475 (W. Va., 191z); Comm. v. King-, 302-
Mass. 379 (1909).
UAct of Apr. 22, 1794, §2; Smith's Laws, Vol. II, p. 187.
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"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait or by any other kind of wilful deliberate
and premeditated killing; or which shall be committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape,
robbery, or burglary,-shall be murder in the first degree; and
all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second
degree."
It is obvious that no person can be convicted of murder in
the first degree unless it be proved that he killed with deliberate
premeditation or by one of the other methods enumerated. It is
therefore certain that, under the common law rules of pleading
and most definitions of essential elements, deliberate premeditation
should be charged in any indictment for murder in the first degree,
as an essential element of the offense. But the Pennsylvania
statute above noticed, further provides:
"And the jury before whom any person indicted for mur-
der shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof,
ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder in the first de-
gree or second degree."
This was interpreted to mean that the common form of indict-
ment for murder was sufficient,* and constitutionally so. Some
twenty-six or more states have followed this decision.",
The legislaire nf Pennsylvania later simplified the indictment
for murder. Copying an English statute.,? it enacted that:
"In any indictment for murder it shall not be necessary to
set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the
death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in
every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did
feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought kill and
murder the deceased."
This statute" was enacted into law in ten or more other states.
The effect of this statute is to make sufficient an indictment
which charges merely the essential elements of common law mur-
der, and it has been held that upon an indictment which charges
"that A. B. did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought
kill and murder C. D.," the accused person may be convicted of
"1 White v. Comm., 6 Bin. 179 (Pa., x813).
"6 Bishop. New Cr. Pro., Vol. I1, §584, note 6.
11 14 & 15 Vict., c. too, §6 (85t).
"Act of Mar. 31, 186o, §20, P. L. 433.
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murder in the first degree."$ Bishop in his work on Criminal
Procedure,-' points out that neither the common law form of in-
dictment nor the legislative form above set out charge the deliber-
ate premeditation which must be proved to establish murder in
the first degree. His arguments to that effect are unanswerable.
These forms do not directly charge deliberate premeditation and
under the common law rules would be insufficient. His conclusion
is that the legislatures had no power to prescribe these forms as
sufficient, and that they are unconstitutional. -In so holding he
condemns as erroneous the decisions of some twenty-five or more
courts, including the United States Supreme Court.s1 He cites in
support of his positions the decisions of some ten states, iu but few
of which the flat question of constitutionality was raised.
It is submitted that the more numerous decisions are correct.
that the forms are constitutional. But "how can they be consti-
tutional if they omit an essential element of the offense?" will be
asked. The only answer is that the indictment need not allege all
the essential elements of the offense in order to be constitutional.
The indictment which contains sufficient matter to enable the ac-
cused to prepare his defense is constitutional. This the indictment
for murder does. No attorney for a person accused of iiiurder has
ever justly claimed that he did not get a fair trial because this
form of indictment enabled the prosecution to surprise him. If
any person had been unjustly hung, being unable to present his
defense because he did not expect deliberate premeditation to be
shown under the charge, the newspapers would have been full of it.
Accused persons get a fair trial in Canada where the charge reads
that "A murdered B ,'0t and a fair trial is all that the constitutions
require.
Thus the courts have held that an indictment which shows
that the prosecution intends to prove one of two offenses (murder
in the first degree or murder in the second degree) or that the prose-
cution intends to prove one of three offenses (larceny, embezzle-
'$ Goerson v. Comm., 99 Pa. 388 (1882); Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129 (1872);
Granes v. State, 45 N. J. L. 347 (1883); State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247 (1897);
Andrews v. People, 33 Cola. 193 (19o5); People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329
(x886); State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582 (1901).
'0* Vol. II, §568-577.
1o1 Danes v. Utah Ter., 151 U. S. 262 (1893).
102 1852, form 64.
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ment, or false pretences) is constitutional. They should, there-
fore, not hesitate to hold that an indictment which shows what
single offense the prosecution intends to prove is also constitu-
tional even though such indictment omits certain elements of that
offense which may fairly be inferred from what the indictment
does state.'U
Thus far only the constitutionality of the proposed ways of
identifying the offense have been discussed. Let us turn our at-
tention to the constitutionality of the proposals regarding those-
averments which serve to individualize the transaction.
The full effect of all the proposals in regard to such avermentes-
is that these averments may be inserted in the charge by the prose-
cuting officer at any time sufficiently prior to the trials to enable-
the accused to prepare his defence thereto, and that if the accused
fails to ask for such particulars he will be deemed to have waived.
his right thereto.
It requires no argument to demonstrate that, where the con-
stitution of the jurisdiction does not require procedure by indict-
ment, the complete charge may constitutionally be made upon
any number of documents found by any number of the departments.
of the court; the prosecuting officer may present the entire charge-
in one or more informations or the grard jury may present part
of the charge in an indictment and the prosecuting officer present:
the other part in a bill of particulars. All that is constitutionally
necessary is that the accused be given the right to demand that
some department or departments of the court inform him of the-
nature and cause of the accusation against him.10 The doubtful
question is whether a formal charge found by a grand jury which
shows what offense is charged, but does not individualize the-
transaction constituting the offense, is an "indictment" in the sense
in which it is used in those constitutions which require trial by-
indictment.
101 Sce Paraiso v. U. S., 207 U. S. 369 (x9o7), approved in Weems v. U. S.,
217 U. S. 349 (1909). Holmes. J.: "The bill of rights for the Philippines, giving
the accused the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against.
him, does not fasten forever upon those islands the inability of the seventeenth
century common law to understand or accept a pleading that did not exclude-
every misinterpretation capable of occurring to intelligence fired with a desire-
to pervert."
114 Comm. v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 320 (1903).
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At common law indictments for certain offenses were held good
-and sufficient which contained absolutely no allegations to differ-
entiate the transaction upon which the prosecution intended to
rely from other transactions of the same character. Indictments
for barratry, affray, being a common scold and being a common
night-walkerlos contained no such allegations. The averments
,of time and place which such indictments contained did not identify
the transaction because the prosecution was never bound to prove
the time and place alleged.Los Similarly, under statutes, indict-
ments have been held good, valid and constitutional which contain
no7 individualizing allegations.101
When prosecuted for these common law and statutory offenses
the accused was usually given, on request, a bill of particulars
stating the transaction to be proved; but the right to a bill was not
.absolute, being dependent upon the discretion of the court. If
the right to a bill is absolute, as is proposed, it seems certain that
.the few courts which held similar indictments unconstitutional
would decide differently. If, in certain offenses, no individualizing
.allegations are required, why should they be required in any indict.
ment?
If the indictment for murder be taken as an illustration, it
will be noticed that in those states which have adopted the English
•statute 0 t' which dispenses with any allegation of the means by
which the murder was committed, the indictment contains but one
averment to identify the transaction, namely, the name of the per-
-son killed. Numerous casest0' hold that this is all that is consti-
tutionally required and no cases hold otherwise.
It may be said that since it is possible to kill a man but once,
the giving of his name is an absolutely certain identification of the
transaction. This would be so if every person had a different
name, but it so happens that there are many duplicated names,
10' Uf supra, page 563, notes 51, 52 and 53.
10$ Archbold, Cr. Pl. and Prac., 24 Ed., pp. 356, 357.
107 Slave trading, Schwartz v. State, 37 Ala. 366 (1861); liquor selling, State
v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134 (1893), following State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140 (885):
affirmed as "due procdss of law" at least, in O'Neil v. Vt., 144 U. S. 323 (189i);
State v. Casey, 45 Me. 435 (1858); contra, Jones v. State, 136 Ala. 118 (1903);
.McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338 (1873).
10' 14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, §6.
10, State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247 (1897); and others, us p,ra p. 573, note 99.
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twenty-two "John Smiths" being listed in the current telephone-
directory for Philadelphia. Which one of many millions of per-
sons whose names are unknown to the grand jury is meant when
the grand jury charges John Doe with the murder of a "person
whose name is unknown to the grand jury?"
Therefore in this exceptional case the indictment for murder
contains no allegation identifying the transaction and in the pre-
paration of his defense the accused person is forced to rely upon
information not contained in the indictment. In this case the
indictment is constitutional and no great complaint has ever been
made of its unfairness. Even when the name of the person killed
is given, it is by statute in most of the jurisdictions permitting this
short form amendable;"'4 so none of these indictments contain any
authoritative individualizing allegation.
Thus the c6urts are very lax in the rules governing indictments
for the most serious offense. Could they constitutionally be as
lax in charging other offenses, offenses which may be repeated
time and time again, against the same person? Would an indict-
ment which did not individualize the transaction at all when charg-
ing larceny or some kindred offense be constitutionally an indict-
ment? The name of the person defrauded is all that is necessary
when charging the obtaining of money or property by the confidence
game."' In charging larceny and some other offenses the name of
the owner and the allegation that "money" was stolen are sufficient,
"money" meaning any currency and negotiable paper." Twenty-
two or more other states have statutes permitting this form of
charge. It has been held unconstitutional to allege that A. B.
embezzled "the property" of C. D. without describing the pro-
perty."' But the accused had no absolute right to a bill of par-
ticulars in this jurisdiction and it does not follow that the decision
would have been the same, had he such right.
The statutes permitting amendment of indictments cover
almost all the allegations which identify the transaction in indict-
ments for the offenses which occur most frequently. These sta-
"' State v. Tolla, 72 N. J. L. 515 (1905).
" Graham v. State, 181 IM. 477 (1899).
11 State v. Barr, 6t N. J. L. I31 (1897); State v. Terry, io9 Mo. 6o1 (18g).
11 State v. Silverman, 82 Atd. Rep. 536 (N. Hamp., 1912).
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tutes have frequently been held constitutional;114 and if a given
name or description may be changed, why should there be any
necessity for the insertion of any name or description in the first
place, other than that which is necessary to show what offense is
intended?
Objection for lack of particularity comes too late after the
verdict; which would not be so if the indictment lacking such par-
ticularity were not a constitutional indictment, sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction.- The cases are not numerous enough to
show whether there is any limit to the lack of particularity by
verdict.
Names and descriptions which cannot be ascertained by the
grand jury may be omitted, provided that they are not essential
constituents of the offense,1 which means that the indictment
need only show what offense is intended. Necessity will not make
constitutional an indictment otherwise unconstitutional.
All these lines of precedent lead to the one conclusion, namely
that the indictment which shows what offense is intended is an in-
dictment within the constitutional sense of the term. Or following
the distinction taken in Newcomb v. State,", quoted with approval
in State v. Schnell,12 an indictment need only show the "nature"
of the accusation. The "cause" may be learned by the accused
elsewhere, and the proposal is to inform him of the "cause" by a
bill of particulars.
An objection to this proposal to permit the placing of all alle-
gations identifying the transaction in a bill of particulars will be
made on the grounds that the indictment would not show for what
transaction the jury indicted the accused. The grand jury might
have found cause to send him to trial for one transaction and he
might be put on trial for another. The answer to this is that no
indictment so identifies the transaction that by no possibility
could the transactions heard by the grand jury and the petit jury
be different. The more numerous the distinct allegations of
14 See Bishop, New Cr. Pro., Vol. 1, 1197-98.
116 State v. Carter, 5x La. Ann. 442 (1899); Dunbar v. U. S., 156 U. S. z85
(1894).
""Lang v. State, 4s Fla. 595 (i9oo).
?737 Miss. 383-397 (1859).
us 24 W. Va. 767 (1884).
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the indictment, the less possibility will there be of such a happen-
ing, but it always exists. Two men of the same name may have
been killed; similar property may have been stolen from persons
of the same name. The rules of the common law said to be so
framed as to make impossible such a happening were purely arbi-
trary. An indictment which charged the stealing of "personal
property" from John Smith was bad even though John Smith had
but one chattel, and the indictment which charged the stealing
of "one gold watch" from John Smith was good even though John
Smith had a thousand gold watches.
The courts have sometimes said that an indictment which
permits of the result that the defendant may be put on trial for
transactions not heard by the grand jury would be unconstitu-
tional,1' never seeming to notice that most indictments do permit
of such result. -Since time is immaterial, the grand jury may have
heard evidence as to an assault committed on January x, and the
trial jury as to an assault on February r.
Another line of cases shows that the courts do not recognize
any right of the accused to be tried for the transaction for which
he has been indicted. If upon an indictment charging but one
offense, the prosecuting officer starts to offer evidence tending to
prove two or more transactions, each constituting the offense charged,
he will be stopped by the court and compelled to elect which trans-
action he will prove. And in none of the cases dealing with election
do we find an intimation that the prosecution must elect to prove
the transaction to which the witnesses before the grand jury swore.211
The only persons who are prejudiced by the lack of this right to
have the transaction identical are the persons who have committed
numerous offenses of the same character, and for them the law does
not, and should not, have much consideration.
The proposal to permit amendment of all allegations individu-
alizing the transaction is, when applied to information, merely a
statement of the common law. Informations were always amend-
able by the prosecuting officer who presented them.
When applied to indictments it is, as before noted,"' an exten-
" State v. Mace, 72 Me. 64 (1884); McLaughlin v. IState, 45 Ind. 338 (1873).
U0 See Report of Commissioners for Simplification of Criminal Pleadings,
Mass., Senate Doc. No. 234 (1899).
mp. 555
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sion of the English statute'1 now commonly adopted in the various
states of the United States. This statute has frequently been held
constitutional.I' The United States Supreme Court, in a case
.already noted,'" held that no indictment could be constitutionally
-amended. Inasmuch as there was no Federal statute permitting
-amendment, the court could have held on common law principles
-that the amendment was improper without going to the extreme
-of holding any amendments unconstitutional. This decision does
not overweigh the numerous decisions of the state courts and in
view of the more liberal attitude shown in the more recent cases
it is submitted that a Federal statute permitting amendment would
be held constitutional by the Supreme Court.
With this discussion, this system of criminal accusation is
-submitted to the consideration of those persons who are interested
n the reform of criminal procedure. The fact that the system
is in practical operation in Canada, New Zealand and India, proves
that the system is workable. Precedents for the various features
,of the system have been found at common law and in statutes in
force in different jurisdictions. The different features have been
held constitutional and it is submitted that the entire system is con-
-stitutional in that it secures to the accused his right to "demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him" and all the
-essential advantages of the common law procedure by indictment.
L. Pearson Scolt.
University of Pennsylvania, June, z913.
1" 14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, §.
lu State v. Tolla, 72 N. J. L. 515 (1905); People v. Johnson, 104 N. Y. :sxt
,(1887); Rough v. Comm., 78 Pa. 495 (1875); State v. Craighead, 32 Mo. 563
t(i862).14Ex park Bain, 121 U. S. 1 (t886).
